Title: Untitled

WHY DID RUSSIA RATIFY THE KYOTO PROTOCOL?

jessica e. tipton

slovo,Vol.20No.2, Autumn 2008, 67–96
WhydidRussiaRatifytheKyoto Protocol?WhytheWait?AnAnalysis oftheEnvironmental,Economic,and PoliticalDebates
JessicaE.Tipton
SchoolofSlavonicandEastEuropeanStudies,UniversityCollegeLondon
In November 2004, after years of deliberation, Russia decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty designed to slow climate change by restricting carbon dioxide (CO^2) emissions amongst signatory countries. After the USA withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, Russian participation was critical to the future of this global agreement. In the run-up to Russia’s eventual ratifi cation, confl icting messages emerged from the country’s authoritative voices and there is still no consensus on what occurred in government circles prior to ratifi cation. This article analyses possible reasons for Russia’s long-awaited decision to ratify the Protocol by looking at Russian and international sources, including media reports, statements released by the Russian government and international organizations, and academic articles. Russia’s circuitous debate over ratifi cation of Kyoto is discussed according to three main sections: environmental, economic, and political. The possible role played by environmental concern is analysed by outlining Russia’s history on environmental policy, Putin’s attitude towards environmental protection, and public opinion vis-à-vis environmental issues. Economics-based arguments considered include: the potential revenues from carbon credit sales and Joint Implementation projects, the costs of implementing Kyoto, the impact of constraining emissions on economic growth, and the infl uence of Russia’s energy sector. The fi nal section discusses the role of various domestic and international political factors.
Glossaryandabbreviations
Annex 1	UNFCCC list of industrialized and transition economy countries that are obliged to comply with specifi c commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
© School of Slavonic & East European Studies, University College London, 2008

GHG
Goskomekologiia
JI

Greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide
Russian State Committee for Environmental Protection Joint Implementation projects. Kyoto mechanism by which emission reduction projects can be implemented jointly by industrialized countries and economies in transition such as Russia.

JUSSCANNZ | Acronym for non-EU group of countries (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine and the USA) that formed during Kyoto negotiations.
LRTAP | Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution control group, a precursor to the Kyoto Protocol

MEDT Minpriroda MNR OECD

Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
Russian State Ministry for Environmental Protection Russian Ministry of Natural Resources
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPEC
UNFCCC

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

RAO UES | United Energy Systems of Russia (private energy company)

RAS RIIA

Russian Academy of Sciences
Royal Institute for International Affairs (formerly Chatham House), U.K.

Rosgidromet | Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring

WTO
WWF

World Trade Organization
World Wildlife Fund

Introduction
Russia fi nally decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in November 2004. The Kyoto Protocol is a United Nations-led global environmental treaty for the period 2008 to 2012, which aims to slow climate change by setting mandatory targets in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, primarily carbon dioxide, for signatory countries. Countries that manage to keep emissions below their targets can then sell surplus carbon credits to other countries risking non-compliance, a system known as ‘carbon trading’. A country in need of credits can also invest in emissions-reducing schemes abroad known as Joint Implementation (JI) projects. Russia was obliged to keep its emissions at or below 1990 levels, an easy target considering that the post-Soviet economic collapse had caused GHG emissions to drop twenty-five percent below that level. Russia was also allowed a further fi ve percent leeway in recognition of its vast forests known as ‘carbon sinks’ for their ability to absorb emissions. Therefore Russia initially envisaged considerable economic gains from selling surplus quotas abroad and from foreign investment via JI projects. After the USA pulled out of the Protocol in March 2001 for fear of the effect on the country’s economy, Russia’s situation became more complicated.
The fi rst stage of the Kyoto Protocol had been to sign the Kyoto Convention, which did not entail any commitment. By 1999 most countries, including Russia and the USA, had signed the Convention. In order for the Protocol then to come into force, a suffi cient number of countries to account for fi fty-fi ve percent of carbon emissions from Annex 1 (industrialized or transition economy) countries had to ratify the Protocol. After the USA (the world’s chief polluter responsible for about a quarter of global emissions) refused to ratify the Protocol, only the weight of Russia’s carbon emissions (at seventeen percent of Annex 1 emissions) could meet the fi fty-five percent threshold. Never before had Russia found itself in such a dominant global position thanks to an environmental treaty. The USA’s departure, however, also meant that Russia had lost its principal purchaser of carbon credits, thus reducing the economic incentives of the Kyoto Protocol for Russia.
The story of Russia’s decision to ratify Kyoto is circuitous. As early as 2001 the Duma showed support for ratifi cation. In December 2002, by which time countries accounting for forty-one percent of Annex 1 emissions had ratifi ed the Protocol, Russian ratification would have enabled the Kyoto Protocol to be implemented. In June 2003 the Russian regions urged the government to ratify the Protocol, at which point President Vladimir Putin announced that he wanted the government to have made a decision by September 2003. Yet Russia waited until late 2004 to ratify the Protocol, thereby stalling the Kyoto process by almost two years. While Russia prevaricated, mixed messages emerged from Putin, his government, advisers, and the media, as to the country’s stance on Kyoto. Consequently it is diffi cult to unravel the decision-making process and establish what finalised the deal. Nevertheless, this article attempts to extract the critical reasons for Russia’s ultimate decision to ratify the Protocol and for the lengthy delay in ratifi cation.
Much of this article concentrates on establishing President Putin’s stance on the Kyoto Protocol and how he was influenced by external factors including scientific and economic advisers, ministries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international pressure. On the whole he appeared to support Kyoto. As Russian observers differed sharply in their opinion of Kyoto, the onus was on Putin to make the fi nal decision. The decision was increasingly the President’s as Putin consolidated power to form his ‘managed democracy’. Therefore Putin’s views and personal advisers played a greater role in Russia’s decision to ratify the Protocol than for most other countries involved in Kyoto.
The various arguments in Russia’s debate over ratification Kyoto will be analysed from three perspectives: environmental, economic, and political. The research is based on a variety of Russian and international sources: printed and electronic media, statements by the Russian government and international organizations, and academic articles published mainly by economists or environmentalists. Some reports are clearly biased, while others present their arguments more evenly. Only official statements and articles by environmentalists are inclined to focus on the Protocol’s ecological aims. Many reports concentrate on the economic implications of ratification, while others tend to focus on the political implications. As speculation over Russia’s relationship with the Kyoto Protocol continues, and the Kyoto mechanisms only began this year, this article does not pretend to provide a final analysis.

When this article was researched, no extensive analysis of the reasons behind Russia’s eventual ratifi cation of the Kyoto Protocol had been published. In March 2006 the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) published RussiaandtheKyotoProtocol:OpportunitiesandChallenges, which focuses mainly on the future prospects for emissions trading and joint implementation projects with Russia and draws some similar conclusions to those reached in this article into what precipitated Russia’s ratifi cation.

Environmentalfactors
Many offi cial statements released after Russia ratifi ed the Protocol celebrated the country’s environmental commitments. ‘Russia has now become not only an ecological donor, but also an ecological leader’; ‘our country’s ratification of Kyoto is evidence of Russia’s growing attention to environmental protection’. Despite the Protocol’s environmental aims, however, the idea that Russia ratified the Protocol for ecological reasons was largely dismissed by most commentators. As a rule, analysis of Russia’s decision concentrates on the economic and political incentives, with any mention of Russia’s good environmental intentions made with scepticism. For example, ‘By approving Kyoto, Mr Putin will claim to stand for stifl ing harmful gases, not just political freedoms’ [my italics]; ‘Is Russia simply a symbolic ratifi er?’. This section discusses whether such sceptical commentators were correct, or whether there is any sincerity behind the offi cial professions of environmental concern.

Vera Sitnina, ‘Poleznye vybrosy’, Vremia novostei, 25 October 2004; ‘Rossiia kak predsedatel G8 predlozhit obsuzhdenie ekologicheskikh problem’, Interfax, 15 November 2005.

‘Kyoto a-go-go’, The Economist, 30 September 2004; Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom and Laura A. Henry, ‘Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: Ratifi cation and Postratifi cation Politics’ (conference paper: University of British Columbia, 2006), pp. 1–10 (p. 1).

Theprecedent:Russia’shistoryofenvironmentalpolicy
The Soviet Union had an ostensibly strong history of participating in global environmental agreements from the 1960s until its fragmentation in 1991. For example, in the early 1960s the Soviet Union participated in the international series of Red Books, which listed near-extinct species. In the 1970s the USSR became an active member of the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution control group (LRTAP), a precursor to Kyoto, and signed many global and bilateral agreements on fi shing, nuclear safety, and pollution control. In 1972 the USSR and USA signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection, which some attribute to helping end the Cold War. The Soviet Union also participated in the UN Environmental Programme and hosted a UNESCO conference on environmental education in 1977. Most of this international environmental activity, however, was driven by ‘high politics’ rather than environmental concern. At a domestic level, a similar trend is apparent. The environment featured prominently in the Soviet Constitution and there was no lack of environmental legislation. Indeed from 1970 to 1990 the number of offi cial nature reserves in the country doubled and a National Wildlife Law was introduced in the 1980s. Yet ineffective implementation of environmental laws meant such moves produced little environmental improvement.

Philip R. Pryde, Environmental Management in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 267.

Geir Hønneland and Anne-Kristin Jørgensen, ‘Implementing International Environmental Agreements in Russia: Lessons from Fisheries Management, Nuclear Safety and Air Pollution Control’, GlobalEnvironmen- talPolitics, 3 (2003), 72–98 (p. 81).

Pryde, pp. 6–8.

In the years preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union the environment played a heightened role in Soviet politics. Much has been written on the link between environmentalism in the former Soviet republics and nationalist movements, which brought an end to the USSR. The combination of glasnost, which enabled citizens to discover the true state of the USSR’s ecological situation, including Lake Baikal’s plight and in particular the 1986 Chernobyl explosion, turned a generalized disquiet over the country’s environmental state into environmental activism. Refl ecting this growing environmental awareness, Mikhail Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to make environmental issues a national priority, seemingly out of genuine concern, culminating in 1987 with his creation of Minpriroda, a Ministry devoted to nature conservation.

Ibid., p. xvii.

Ibid., p. 3.

Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, however, both ordinary post-Soviet Russians and their political representatives have been preoccupied by issues seemingly more urgent than the environment. Russia showed willingness to address environmental issues with its adoption of an Energy Strategy in 1993 and in 1996 when it signed a Federal Climate Programme. However, the low budget assigned to the Programme implied that this was little more than a symbolic move. In the 1990s Russia also set up a successful project to save the near-extinct Amur tiger in the Far East. At the same time, however, the downgrading by Boris Eltsin of the aforementioned Minpriroda to a less-important Committee (Goskomekologiia) in 1996 (to be abolished subsequently by Putin) indicates Russian offi cials’ lack of genuine offi cial ecological concern at the time. On an international level, post-Soviet Russia continued to sign multilateral environmental agreements, such as the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. However, a continuing trend from Soviet days of empty rhetoric can be identified, with the main reasons for Russia’s cooperation in environmental agreements being far from genuine environmental concern.

Tatiana G. Avdeeva, ‘Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: Challenges Ahead’, RECIEL, 14 (2005), 293–302 (pp. 299–300).

‘World’s Biggest Tiger Living in Russian Woods Saved from Extinction’, Pravda, 15 July 2005.

Elena Nikitina, ‘Russia: Climate Policy Formation and Implementation During the 1990s’, ClimatePolicy, 1 (2001), 289–308 (p. 291).

In terms of Russian climate policy in the 1990s, although Russia was one of the first to sign the Rio United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, Russia appeared to view the issue as ‘primarily a matter for economically prosperous countries’. In further meetings of the UNFCCC from 1995 to 1996, Russia was again defensive and ‘went almost unnoticed’. At this time many Russian scientists were deeply sceptical of climate change and Russian offi cials 

Jonathan D. Oldfi eld, Anna Kouzmina, and Denis Shaw, ‘Russia’s Involvement in the International Environ-
mental Process: A Research Report’, EurasianGeographyandEconomics, 44 (2003), 157–168 (p. 157).

Friedemann Muller, ‘Russia and Climate Change’ in InternationalPoliticsofClimateChange:KeyIssuesand CriticalActors, ed. by Gunnar Fermann (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), p. 296.

preferred to side with OPEC countries due to concern over Russian oil sales. Continuing the trend of seemingly empty gestures, Russia signed the Kyoto Convention in 1997 but remained inactive. However, the year 1998 seemed to represent a minor watershed in Russia’s approach to emissions reduction. That year saw Russia transform itself from reluctant party to enthusiastic supporter of ‘free market’ emissions trading and strengthened its alliance with JUSSCANNZ, an umbrella group of non-EU countries active in the Kyoto negotiations.

In an interesting reversal of roles, after Russia’s accession to the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, seven OPEC countries were inspired to follow suit and ratify the Protocol, demonstrating Russia’s newfound role as catalyst for international environmental cooperation.

The fi rst stage of the Kyoto Protocol was to sign the Kyoto Convention, which did not entail any commitment. Most countries had signed by 1999. In order for the Protocol come into force, however, countries then had to commit by ratifying the Protocol.

Arild Moe and Kristian Tangen, TheKyotoMechanismsandRussianClimatePolitics (London: RIIA, 2000), p. 15.

Putinandenvironmentalprotection
There are many indications that Putin did not rate ecological issues highly. This stance was perhaps understandable considering the scale of Russia’s problems and would have been consistent with most Russians’ views. One of his fi rst acts after winning the presidency in 2000 was to abolish Goskomekologiia, along with other environmental committees, and put all such concerns under the Ministry for Natural Resources (MNR). This action, undertaken with the stated aim of reducing government bureaucracy, gave credence to the suggestion made by Russian and inter national environmentalists that ‘a process of ‘de-ecologization’ had been taking place in the Russian government since the late 1990s’.

Oldfield et al., p. 162.; David Hoffman, ‘Putin Abolishes Russian Environmental Agencies Without Comment’, WashingtonPost, 22 May 2000.

Another sign of Putin’s environmental indifference can be seen in his initially enthusiastic support for an oil pipeline from Southern Siberia to China, seen as key to economic development but widely criticised for the ecological ramifi cations (Putin’s subsequent volte face is discussed below). Putin also backed controversial proposals, worth billions of dollars in revenue, for Siberia to import nuclear waste for reprocessing and storage. He even expressed distrust of green movements, declaring in 2000 that ‘environmentalists were working as foreign spies’.

D.J. Peterson and Eric K. Bielke, ‘The Reorganization of Russia’s Environmental Bureaucracy: Implications and Prospects’, Post-SovietGeographyandEconomics, 42(2001), 65–76 (p. 72).

Peterson and Bielke, p. 74.

Vladimir Putin quoted in Hoffman.

Despite such indications of environmental indifference, Putin occasionally acted with seemingly good ecological intentions. In 2001 he developed the Ecological Doctrine of Russia and the Strategy of Sustainable Development. In 2003 he convened a State Council Presidium to discuss improving Russia’s environment. Other seemingly positive steps taken by the Putin administration include: the adoption of Russia’s 2001 Biodiversity Strategy; a Russia-China pact to monitor jointly the water quality of cross-border rivers after the Amur River chemical spill in November 2005; and Putin’s decision in April 2006 to order the redirection of the aforementioned Siberia-China pipeline so that it would avoid Lake Baikal. However, some have cast doubt on whether Russia’s Ecological Doctrine was again just rhetoric. While the Presidium was described as the fi rst time that environmental issues had been discussed at such a level for a decade, the forum was actually only symbolic and minimal resources were channelled to the measures proposed.

‘Russia: Putin Orders Baikal Pipeline Rerouted’, RFE/RLNewsline, (27 April 2006) <http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2006/04/d8dcab87-37cf-4bd6-9af6-aef0c5c8bb8a.html> [accessed 31 April 2006].

Oldfi eld et al., p. 162–63.

’Putin Chairs Meeting to Consider Russian Ecology Doctrine, Fines for Polluters’, BBCMonitoring (Source: RadioMaiak, Moscow), (5 June 2003) <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7210-19.cfm> [accessed 1 March 2006].

Putin’s ambiguous stance towards the environment reflects his attitude towards the Kyoto Protocol as an environmental treaty. At times he attested to Russia’s desire to ratify the Protocol out of ecological concern, arguing that Russia should be ‘reluctant to make the decision just on financial considerations. We should be guided primarily by more noble ideas’. Putin also commented on the humanitarian risks from droughts and fl oods as a result of global warming. At other times he appeared openly to view Kyoto ‘from the point of view of economic advantages and greater ties with world leaders’. Most tellingly, in Putin’s own statement following ratifi cation no mention was made of its ecological basis: ‘The obligations placed by the Protocol on Russia will have serious consequences for our economic and social development. The decision to ratify was based on the development of international co-operation and knowing that it will only enter into force provided that Russia participates’.

Sundstrom and Henry, p. 8.

Anna Korppoo, Jacqueline Karas, and Michael Grubb, Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunities and Challenges (London: RIIA, 2006), p. 5.

Michael Grubb, Breer, Benito Müller et al., Strategicheskii analiz Kioto-Marrakeshskoi Sistemy (London: RIIA, 2003), p. 10.

‘Spravka k federalnomy zakonu “O ratifikatsii Kiotskogo Protokola k Ramochnoi konventsii Organizatsii Obedinennykh Natsii ob izmenenii klimata”, Russian government decree, 4 November 2004.

Russianpublicopiniononenvironmentalissues
Many believe that Putin’s gestures towards environmental concern were just part of his foreign policy initiative to improve relations with Europe. Indeed, all of Putin’s environmental measures outlined above were eye-catching enough to be reported in the Western press. On the other hand, these environmental policies, although infrequent, could imply that Russian public concern for the environment was suffi cient for the President to try and appease it on occasion. After public concern reached its height in the late 1980s, polls have since indicated that while many ordinary postSoviet Russians are passively worried by environmental issues, most have neither the time, willingness, nor resources to take action. Not one environmental party stood in the 2003 State Duma elections. And yet Putin’s abolition of Goskomekologiia provoked outcries from environmentalists, scientists, the Russian Orthodox Church, NGOs, and the general public, with polls showing that over eighty-seven percent of Russians disagreed with the measure. This discontent perturbed the President to the extent that he attempted to quell outcries with such assurances as ‘environmental protection will remain a priority for Russia’. Therefore it seems that Putin’s abolition of Goskomekologiia, followed by the debate about the Kyoto Protocol, galvanised more (if only at a low level) environmental concern in Russia than had been seen for quite some time.

L.A. Presniakova, ‘Problemy ekologii’, Opinion Poll, 22 November 2001; Liudmila Presniakova, ‘Ekologiches- kaia situatsiia v regionakh’, Opinion Poll, 7 July 2005, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/ dom0527/domt0527_2/d052724/printable/> [accessed 10 February 2006] (last paragraph).

Peterson and Bielke, p. 70.

Vladimir Putin quoted in Peterson and Bielke, p. 72.

It is important to emphasise the lack of awareness of most Russians regarding climate change and the Kyoto Protocol compared with other signatory countries. Although there are reports that Russians may have shown their support for Kyoto were they more aware of the issue, domestic public opinion did little to influence Putin’s decision. According to a 1999 survey, although seventy-seven percent of Russians were conscious of sharp abnormalities in their region’s climate, these changes worried few respondents. In a 2003 survey of a thousand Russian citizens by Greenpeace Russia, eighty-one percent of respondents had never heard of the Kyoto Protocol, and seventy-four percent did not know whether Russian ratifi cation of it would help resolve climate change. This compares with a survey commissioned by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 2001, which revealed that nearly eighty percent of the British public wanted the UK government to ratify Kyoto whether or not the USA were involved, and nearly ninety percent were in favour of the UK government doing more to reduce the UK’s contribution to climate change. As a result of the lack of public awareness in Russia, the phrase ‘global warming’ triggered many Russians, including scientists, to respond that such a phenomenon would surely benefit their country’s overall cold climate. Many Kyoto proponents put the Russian public’s ambivalence down to the absence of media coverage on climate change and the Kyoto process. The subject failed to reach the press until 2001, long after the topic had reached the Western media. In addition, some have asserted that eighty percent of the few media reports to emerge on the subject were either negative or incorrect. Another reason for the lack of public awareness was Putin’s aforementioned marginalization of environmental organizations as ‘foreign agents’. The absence of environmental NGOs from the political process, the groups most knowledgeable about global warming, was offset by the overwhelming presence of uninformed advisers and politicians.

Sundstrom and Henry, p. 6.

Anna Petrova, Anatolii Cherniakov, Svetlana Klimova, and Ekaterina Iadova, ‘Russians Are Not Concerned about Climate Change’, Russian survey of urban and rural populations (1500 respondents), (5 June 1999) <1999.http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/problem_soc/environment/of19992506> [accessed 10 February 2006].

Sundstrom and Henry, p. 6.

‘British Public Supports the Kyoto Protocol’, WWF-UK, (12 June 2001) <http://www.wwf.org.uk/news/n_ 0000000292.asp> [accessed 22 February 2001].

Sundstrom and Henry, p. 6.

TheinfluenceofRussianscientists
Scientific opinion in Russia was divided on the issue of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol and this undoubtedly caused delay in decision-making. By the time of ratification, most Russian climate scientists, ecologists, and environmental economists supported ratification agreeing that a) carbon emissions accelerate globally warming, and b) Russia’s predicted pace and carbon intensity of economic growth meant that the country could comply with Kyoto at no economic cost.
A small but particularly vocal set of Russian scientists, however, continued to contest the Kyoto Protocol on several fronts. Of these, some believed that global warming would benefit a cold country like Russia. This view was dismissed by even the most conservative Western European assessment of the effect of climate change on Russia, carried out by the World Bank, which concluded that ‘it is not clear that Russia belongs to the camp of the ‘winners’ of climate change [. . .]. There is suffi cient uncertainty on the scale and direction of different impacts that it would be a big risk to assume that, net, Russia could be better off’. The report continued by saying that Russia would be affected by damage to other countries from climate change, triggering changes in world markets, migration, and confl ict over natural resources.

Franck Lecocq and Zmarak Shalizi, ‘Will the Kyoto Protocol Affect Growth in Russia?’, WorldBankPolicy
ResearchWorkingPaper, 3454 (2004), p. 22–23.

Ibid.

Other Russian scientists contested that anthropogenic actions were responsible for global warming, while others doubted the existence of climate change. Indeed, the most respected and visible climatologist in Russia, Iurii Izrael, who chaired the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) council-seminar on Kyoto, was one of the most powerful Russian opponents of the Protocol. He headed a report, presented to Putin in 2003, which concluded that the Protocol ‘lacks scientifi c validity and would not be effective’. Consequently, many thought this was the view of the whole of the RAS, prompting over 250 RAS members to respond by signing a petition in support of ratification. Despite such support, there were too many vocal scientific doubts in Russia over climate change for Putin to be infl uenced positively by the scientifi c grounds for ratifi cation.

Sundstrom and Henry, p. 3.

Economicfactors
Since the Kyoto Protocol is market based, the possible economic benefits and drawbacks of Russia’s participation proved critical in the debate over ratifi cation. The importance of economic factors is shown by the appointment of the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development to co-chair the Russian Government’s Interdepartmental Committee on Climate Change. Indeed, the strongest objections to Kyoto, as in the USA, were economics-based.
It is not difficult to understand why Putin’s advisers took a long time to analyse the economic situation, especially after the US withdrawal, which reduced the economic incentives of ratification. Firstly, as Russia was still in a state of economic flux it was hard to predict how the Protocol would affect the economy. Secondly, Russia’s government and other policy-making bodies were still in a transient, disorganised phase, which made it diffi cult for them to reach a consensus. Thirdly, Russia is such a unique country that it was easy to find flaws in any comparative economic analyses made between Russia and other countries, making it hard to detect possible trends in terms of economic growth, energy effi ciency, and carbon emissions. Finally, Russia relies to such a great extent on the energy sector for revenue that economists had to be certain that Kyoto would not detrimentally affect this critical industry. At the same time, the US withdrawal from Kyoto left Russia in an ideal bargaining position to secure economic concessions as compensation, which many believe explains the extensive delay in ratifying the Protocol.
Theroleofeconomists
As in much of Russia’s decision making, certain individuals featured prominently in the various economic debates over ratification. Although the fate of the Protocol was primarily in the hands of Putin, his lack of expertise in economics meant that he relied on economists to reach a decision on the fi nancial impact of ratifi cation. Probably the most vocal Russian economists to back Kyoto were Igor Bashmakov (Director of Russia’s Centre for Energy Effi ciency), Tatiana Avdeeva (Senior Researcher at the Russian Foreign Ministry), and Iurii Safonov (Moscow’s Higher School of Economics). Yet none of the economic supporters were as infl uential or as brash as the Kyoto opponent and economic adviser to Putin, Andrei Illarionov, who spoke frequently at international Kyoto Protocol meetings. He made such hyperbolic statements as ‘[the agreement would] doom Russia to poverty, weakness and backwardness’; ‘like fascism and communism, Kyotoism is an attack on basic human freedoms behind a smokescreen of propaganda’. Illarionov’s public opposition to the Protocol apparently caused many government offi cials either to oppose ratifi cation or fall silent.

Andrei Illarionov quoted in Tim Hirsch, ‘Climate Talks End Without Result [Illarionov at World Climate Change Conference in Moscow]’, BBCNews (3 October 2003) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3163030. stm> [accessed 2 February 2006]; Andrei Illarionov, ‘Kyoto’s Smoke Screen Imperils Us All’, FinancialTimes, 15 November 2004.

As a close aide to Putin, Illarionov usually held sway over the President in economic areas. However, Illarionov’s negative analysis of the financial implications of Kyoto did not stop ratification. Consequently, rumours emerged that he had simply been bargaining for the best deal for Russia, whilst knowing that Putin would ratify the Protocol all along. Yet Illarionov did appear to react with genuine disillusionment to Russia’s eventual ratification: ‘it is not a decision which we have made with pleasure’;‘[Kyoto implementation] is for most of the world bad news’. It seems that there were disagreements between Illarionov and the President on many issues, as demonstrated by Illarionov’s subsequent resignation in December 2005. It was reported that ‘one of the reasons [for his resignation was] that he did not agree with ratification of the Kyoto Protocol’. Although Illarionov did not ultimately succeed in halting the process, almost unaided he managed to delay Russia’s ratification of the Protocol. Whatever his motive, this delay did nonetheless secure economic concessions for Russia. Many diplomats, however, were convinced that any further delay ‘would have resulted in [. . .] economic losses for the country’.

Andrei Illarionov quoted in Sergei Leskov, ‘Politekologiia. Rossiia Prisoediniaetsia k Kiotskomy Protokolu’, Izvestiia, 1 October 2004.; Illarionov.

‘Illarionov Resigns as Presidential Aide’, Interfax, (27 December 2005) <http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/fi nanc- es/26.html?id_issue=11441928> [accessed 12 February 2006].

E. Fedotov, ‘Russia Stands to Lose from the Refusal to Ratify the Kyoto Protocol’, RamblerMassMedia, 30
September 2004.

Incomefromcarboncreditsales
Initially prospects for selling carbon emission credits were believed to be Russia’s main incentive for participating in Kyoto. The American departure, however, ‘removed a major financial attraction’, as the market for carbon quotas was reduced and so the value of these credits dropped. Without the USA’s participation, Russia wanted to ensure that it would still fi nd suffi cient demand for its likely credits. This lack of guaranteed income precipitated Russia’s wary attitude towards the possible economic gains.

Oldfi eld et al., p. 164.

Kyoto opponents painted worst-case scenarios regarding Russia’s opportunities for selling quotas. lllarionov called Russia’s opportunities ‘completely illusory’, declaring that in the period from 2008 to 2012, Japan and the European Union (EU) together would not demand the supply of quotas generated by Russia, Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe. He predicted that by 2013 or 2014 Russia would become a consumer, rather than a supplier of quotas, since economic growth would generate higher carbon emissions. Another Russian Kyoto sceptic predicted a drop in income from $10 billion to a mere $1 billion without the USA’s involvement, and doubted whether EU countries would rush to buy credits from Russia rather than from EU member Central and Eastern European countries. Indeed this was a valid concern, as acknowledged by the World Bank in the following statement: ‘Ukraine and other transition economies could in theory supply all the 2,500 [CO²] required by countries in need of allowances [. . .although] this scenario has a low probability of occurrence for several reasons’. Some also feared Japan, a key potential purchaser of Russian credits, would be reluctant to make deals with Russia due to historical antagonisms.

‘Illarionov’s Remarks at Press Conference on Climate Change’, FederalNewsService, Moscow, 8 July 2004.

Iulia Tutina, ‘Priroda i mi: idkiotskii protokol’, ArgumentiiFakti, 20 October 2004.

Lecocq, p. 22–23.

Michael Grubb, ‘The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol’, WorldEconomics, 4 (2003), 143–189 (p. 172–23).

Kyoto proponents predicted that Russia could still earn significant revenue without US involvement but differed greatly over how much. Oleg Pluzhnikov, Deputy Head of the Energy Ministry’s Ecological Department, put potential earnings at only one to two billion dollars; the World Bank expected a minimum of six billion dollars; Greenpeace Russia reckoned the country could earn at least twenty billion dollars. This income would derive from Russia selling its carbon surplus to the remaining high emission countries signed up to Kyoto, including western EU countries, Japan, and Canada. Japan especially, in response to aforementioned worries that historical hostilities with Russia would hinder carbon trading, showed enthusiasm for buying Russian credits. Russian Kyoto supporters also pointed out the potential for Russia to push up prices by banking credits instead of selling them immediately. As a counter to Illarionov’s prediction that Russia would become a net buyer of credits by 2013, Kyoto supporters pointed out that the current document only refers to the period 2008 to 2012, at which point new criteria would be agreed by all signatories. They added that since Russia had secured a good deal this time, it was likely that it could do so again.

Greg Walters, ‘Russia Still Hesitant on Ratifying Kyoto’, St.PetersburgTimes, 5 August 2003.

Lecocq, pp. 22–23.

Walters, ‘Russia Still Hesitant’.

‘Japan Eager to Buy Russian Emission Credits’, AsahiShimbun, 17 January 2003.

Grubb et al., p. 8.

Michael Grubb, RussianEnergyandCO2EmissionProspects:EvidencefromDomesticAnalysesandInterna- tionalComparisons (London: RIIA, 2004), p. 6.

Russia’s‘hotair’
In his bid to decry Russia’s possible economic gains from Kyoto, Illarionov often mentioned the contentious issue of ‘hot air’, a term used to refer to the carbon credit surplus accrued as a result of post-Soviet industrial collapse rather than through specific environmental measures. Illarionov warned that Russia may be prohibited from trading ‘hot air’ credits under the Kyoto agreements, substantially reducing the country’s potential income. Indeed Canada, home to many environmental NGOs and a relatively environmentally-aware public, openly voiced its dissatisfaction at the idea of buying ‘hot air’ credits from Russia for ‘doing nothing’.

‘Illarionov’s Remarks’.

Grubb, ‘The Economics’, p. 173.

As the only Russian to take part in drafting the Kyoto Protocol’s clauses, Igor Bashmakov, a Russian economist and Kyoto-supporter, was in a position to resolve the legal aspect of Russia’s ‘hot air’. He argued that since even advanced EU countries have accrued emissions reductions by default rather than through purposeful ecological measures, it should not matter exactly how emissions have been reduced, especially since the planet itself is not concerned by the reason. Bashmakov also maintained that potential income generated by the fallout in Russian industry would serve as compensation for a diffi cult period for Russia and could be invested in future energy-effi ciency projects. These points were accepted, leaving Russia legally able to trade credits from its ‘accidental’ emissions reduction. Nevertheless, since the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms are market based, countries can still decide that they do not wish to purchase units from Russia. Such reservations on the part of potential purchasers were seemingly quelled by Russia’s provisions for Green Investment Schemes, in which profi t from carbon credit sales would be spent on environmental projects, an idea fi rst proposed in 2001 by the Russian government.

I. Bashmakov, ‘Skol’ko stoit smiagchenie antropogennogo vozdeistviia na izmenenie klimata?’, Voprosi ekonomiki, 1 (2003), 104–16.

Avdeeva, p. 297.

JointImplementationprojects
Perhaps the most lucrative benefi t on offer to Russia through Kyoto was the Joint Implementation scheme. This scheme would allow high emission Kyoto participants to earn carbon credits by investing in emissions-reducing projects in foreign, often less developed, countries such as Russia. Many observers predicted that for Russia this much needed investment held significantly more long-term value than the direct monetary revenue provided by carbon credit sales, especially after the US withdrawal from the Protocol. Russia’s energy industry, after quickly realising the benefi t of cheap modernization and energy effi ciency improvements from JI projects, urged Putin to ratify the Protocol. Many proponents suggested that Canada, as it faces similar climate and energy problems to Russia, would be in a good position to use its expertise in Russian JI projects. Despite the historical bilateral antagonisms, neighbouring Japan has already invested in Russian JI projects. The British government and UK-based companies have also invested in them. As the JI projects are market based like carbon trading, however, there is still no guarantee that countries will invest in emissions-abatement schemes in Russia. Furthermore, the more Russia prevaricated over its decision to ratify the Protocol, the more it was losing out on potential investment, especially to Ukraine, thus giving stronger ammunition to the Kyoto cynics.

Grubb, ‘The Economics’, p. 173; ‘Shell zainteresovana v realizatsii v RF proektov v ramkakh Kiotskogo Protokola’, Interfax, 23 November 2005; Defra, UK-RussiaCooperation:WorkingTogetherforaSustainable Future (London: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2005).

Michael Grubb, ‘Kyoto and the Future of International Climate Change Responses: From Here to Where?’, InternationalReviewforEnvironmentalStrategies, 5 (2004), xx–xxx.

Effectofcomplianceoneconomicgrowth
Many Kyoto sceptics were worried about the direct cost of implementing Kyoto mechanisms resulting from data collection and new technology requirements. One critic warned that ‘global warming restraining programs are evaluated at up to fortyseven trillion dollars’. It is true that in many areas Russia was far behind other Kyoto signatories in terms of data collection and had even considered purchasing a registry from abroad. There are many Russian and Western studies, however, which set out to disprove such concerns. One British study revealed that many Russian private companies, such as Gazprom and United Energy Systems (RAO UES), had already implemented inventories and many regions had compiled statistics. The study concluded that although there were many inadequate areas, ‘these problems should be easy to solve if there is a real political will to do so’. In an attempt to quell any remaining fears, the EU pledged 3.5 million dollars to help Russia meet its Kyoto commitments, although many Russians derided this sum.

Sergei Malinin, ‘Kyoto Protocol to Destroy Russian Economy with Unnecessary Payments’, Pravda, (5 July 2005) <http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/15756_kyoto.html> [accessed 15 January 2006].

‘Summary Report: EU-Russia Workshop on Climate Investments under Kyoto Protocol’, European Union, (November 2004) <http://www.technologycentre.org/upload_fi les/Summary_Kyoto_Holland.pdf> [accessed 22 January 2006].

Anna Korppoo, Russia and Compliance under Kyoto: An Institutional Approach (London: RIIA, 2004), pp. 6–9.

Anne Egelston, ‘Will Russia Save the Kyoto Protocol?’, EnvironmentalFinance, (2003), (p. 21).

An even more critical economic question was whether Russia could raise living standards while constraining emissions. Many Russian Kyoto sceptics, such as the Russian Institute of Economic Analysis, cast doubt on the possibility of realising Putin’s promise of doubling GDP in a decade if Russia were obliged to keep emissions at or below 1990 levels. Pravda published the most drastic prognosis: ‘economic activity on the territory of [Russia] is supposed to drop by seventy to eighty percent’. Some critics were also concerned that Kyoto would impede Russia’s economic growth further into the twenty-fi rst century, a worry frequently cited with emotion in the Russian press.

Russian Institute of Economic Analysis, ‘Possible Ratifi cation of the Kyoto Protocol by the Russian Federation and its Economic Implications’, Moscow, 2004.

Malinin.

In opposition to this negativity, Kyoto proponents asserted that Russia’s future prosperity would not be hindered by the emissions caps. Infl uential fi gures and organizations from within and outside Russia, including Igor Bashmakov, Danilov- Danilian (former Minister of Ecology), Iuri Safonov (Moscow’s Higher School of Economics), Russia’s State Duma, members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, London’s Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), the World Bank, many foreign and Russian journalists, and crucially, Russia’s energy industry disagreed with the view that Russia would have any diffi culty complying with the Protocol or that the economy would be hindered.
Such backers firstly emphasised the generous compliance targets allocated to Russia. They argued that, unlike EU countries and the USA, which were set stringent targets, even if Russia made no effort to reduce emissions, thus avoiding the costs of modernisation, it would still meet the requirements. In a paper published by London’s RIIA, Michael Grubb remarked that since emissions correlate with population growth, Russia’s current population decline would actually cause the country’s emissions to fall. In any case, there are no fi nancial penalties built into the Protocol for non-compliance, and so ‘the worst case “sanction” would be a ban on taking part in international emissions trading [and earning] the reputation of an international outcast’.

Grubb, RussianEnergy, p. 4.

V. Berdin, S.Vasiliev, V.Danilov-Danilian, A.Kokorin, and S.Kuraev, The Kyoto Protocol: Questions & Answers, Russian Regional Environment Center, National Carbon Union, WWF Russia, (2004), <http://www. wwf.ru/resources/publ/book/eng/59/> [accessed 27 January 2006] (p. 5).

The second plank of the Kyoto supporters’ argument was the several pro-Kyoto studies arguing that reducing emissions could only be compatible with economic growth, since unsustainable energy use itself is costly. Grubb stated that ‘Russia couldn’t physically double GDP if energy-effi ciency did not improve’ and used international evidence from richer OECD countries and former Soviet bloc countries to show that GDP growth actually correlates with decreased emissions through greater energy-effi ciency. A World Bank paper pointed out that since Russia had modernised its industry less than many other former Soviet countries, it had more room for improvement and thus more opportunity to earn carbon credits.

Grubb, RussianEnergy, p. 4.

Lecocq, p. 11.

A further argument put forward by supporters was that reducing emissions would have a benefi cial effect on air pollution, which currently presents a real threat to Russians’ health. The Centre for Russian Ecology Policy stated that 40,000 Russians died because of air pollution (although without mentioning a time span) and an article in RusskiiKurer asserted that pollution is responsible for seven percent of all Russian deaths. Since Russia is suffering from a demographic crisis, in part caused by high mortality from illness, lowering air pollution should be an important task for Russia regardless of Kyoto. Furthermore, Kyoto would lower the cost of improving Russia’s air quality, thanks to JI projects and Green Investment Schemes.

Bashmakov, pp. 104–16.

‘Press-reliz rabochei vstrechi v ramkakh sotsial’nogo foruma po izmeneniiu klimata’, Russian Centre for Ecological Policy website, (16 September 2004) <http://www.ecopolicy.ru/?id_rec=163> [accessed 22 December 2005]; Konstantin Frumkin, ‘Rossiia Reshila Spasti Mir’, Russkiikur’er, 27 September 2004.

To counter the argument that Kyoto would affect Russia’s long-term prosperity, the pro-Kyoto media and organizations stressed that the current Protocol is only for 2008 to 2012. The aforementioned World Bank paper derided a vehemently antiKyoto study by the Russian Institute for Economic Analysis as ‘wrong’ in implying that Russia would be accepting targets likely to restrict severely the country’s longterm emissions and growth. Moreover, proponents argued that ‘it is much easier to influence decisions on a post-2012 Kyoto regime when you are not an outsider, but a fully fl edged party to the process’. Other observers also pointed out that the USA may rejoin Kyoto, especially if the process were proven to be successful.

Russian Institute of Economic Analysis, ‘Possible Ratifi cation of the Kyoto Protocol by the Russian Federation and its Economic Implications’, Moscow, 2004.

Lecocq, p. 21.

Avdeeva, p. 301.

The practice of correlating reduced emissions and economic growth refl ects a more Western European approach to the Kyoto Protocol, although it is shared by some Russians. Michael Grubb referred to the problem of many Russians’ outdated thinking: ‘[the European view that prosperity is compatible with reduced emissions] can be counter-intuitive for many Russian observers who tend to believe, similar to the conventional wisdom in the OECD in the 1970s, that increased economic growth required a roughly equivalent increase in energy use’. Such divergence between Western and Russian points of view refl ects the differing opinions over the science of climate change, with some Russian observers assuming their country would benefit from some warming and some studies concluding that Antarctica was becoming colder. Since many of the Russian economic objections were not based on facts, it seems that such arguments were either uninformed, or were used simply as bargaining tactics.

Grubb, RussianEnergy, p. 4.

Malinin.

Russia’senergysector
Russia’s national budget is buoyed heavily by the energy sector, which comprises about twenty-fi ve percent of GDP and forty-two percent of total export income. Consequently, Russia’s energy industry played a considerable role in the debate about the Kyoto Protocol. Although the industry was initially sceptical about Kyoto, reportedly by 2000 there were not any Russian enterprises that argued against the adoption of the Protocol. Several big Russian corporations, namely Gazprom and RAO UES, actively lobbied in favour. In the words of Oleg Pluzhnikov, Deputy Head of the Ministry of Economics’ Environmental Department, ‘business pressure played a positive role in the ratification process’. Some now believe that many Russian businesses remained silent, not because they opposed Kyoto, but because they worried about finding themselves at odds with the government’s eventual decision on ratifi cation.

CEPA, Costs and Benefits to the Russian Federation of the Kyoto Protocol (Cambridge: Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2004), p. 109.

Oleg Pluzhnikov quoted in Sundstrom and Henry, pp. 5–6.

Sundstrom and Henry, p. 5.

The energy sector desired ratifi cation of Kyoto for a number of reasons. Firstly, energy companies saw JI projects as a cheap way of rehabilitating the energy industry, with some industry insiders predicting an imminent and severe energy crisis without modernization. Secondly, the industry believed they could make profi ts from carbon trading due to Russia’s generous emissions targets, especially with the help of improvements in energy effi ciency from JI investment. Since Russia’s energy sector is notoriously carbon intensive, it has vast potential for energy-saving and emissions- reducing improvements. Thirdly, the energy sector looked forward to an increase in natural gas sales because, as an emissions-friendly energy resource, it would be in demand from other Kyoto signatories. Since Russia is already the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, this increased demand represented an important source of revenue. As reported in a German journal, the Russian company RAO UES argued that Russia could maximise profits by burning more coal for its own needs (reflecting the generosity of the country’s Kyoto emissions targets) while reserving natural gas for the envisaged increased demand from other Kyoto participants.

CEPA, p. 113.

Grubb, RussianEnergy, p. 3.

Ibid., p. 6.

Axel Michaelowa and Tobias Koch, ‘Russland: der passende Schlüssel zum Inkrafttreten des Kioto-Proto- kolls?’, Wirtschaftsdienst, (2002), 561–64 (p. 562).

Even in the face of the cynics who argued that despite these sizeable gains the Russian economy would suffer from reduced sales of carbon-intensive natural resources to Kyoto Protocol countries trying to reduce emissions, Russian energy companies still felt that the mentioned benefi ts from Kyoto would outweigh any potential losses. In any case, Russia could expect to sell oil to the Americans after their withdrawal from Kyoto, while at the same time benefi ting from increased natural gas sales to signatory countries. Furthermore, after the EU announced its intention to proceed with emissions trading regardless of the ratification of Kyoto, Russia would nonetheless expect reduced demand for coal and oil even if it stalled the treaty by not ratifying.
The active involvement of key Russian businesses in supporting ratification would have been critical to Putin’s stance on the issue, since the country was in many ways still in the hands of the energy corporations, despite attempts to reduce the oligarchs’ power. Long before ratifi cation Gazprom and RAO UES had set up their own GHG inventories in preparation for the Kyoto Protocol. Early on RAO UES announced proposals to set up more than thirty JI projects over the coming years aimed at securing at least twenty million tons of emissions reductions. This early zeal for the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms may imply that these companies knew Russia would ratify the Protocol from the outset. The power of the business sector in Kyoto politics is also demonstrated by Russia’s focus on using Kyoto as a means of boosting industrial profits through JI projects, while overlooking environmentalists’ pleas for measures to secure significant emissions reductions. Interestingly, there is an irony in big business’s support for Kyoto. It is widely believed that Putin was personally interested in using the Kyoto process as a negotiating tool for Russia to gain membership of the World Trade Organization. Reportedly, he wanted Russia to join the WTO order to place the oligarchs under international rules and thereby reduce their dominance.

‘RAO UES of Russia to Implement Over 30 Projects Within the Kyoto Protocol in the Next Few Years’, RAO UESPressRelease, Moscow, 16 February 2005.

It could be argued that the enthusiasm from Russian big business for Kyoto indicates the ineffectiveness of such generous emissions caps and the extent to which the energy industry would gain. Kyoto could prove reminiscent of post-Soviet privatization deals, which saw a few oligarchs benefi t astonishingly from state assets, rather than the State Treasury and the overall population. Nevertheless, even if companies like Gazprom and RAO UES simply see Kyoto as an economic, or even lucrative, method of modernising their industries, this would still benefi t Russians through the positive impact on pollution, health, market energy costs, and potential tax revenue.
Politicalfactors
In assessing the part played by politics in Russia’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, this section fi rst deals with domestic entities followed by international bodies and issues.
Governmentministries,advisers,StateDumaandtheregions
There was considerable uncertainty amongst Russian ministries and government advisers over the issue of ratification. As Figure 1 (below) shows, not one Russian ministry consistently supported ratifi cation.
The Energy Ministry appeared to offer enthusiastic support for Kyoto until it merged with the Ministry for Industry in March 2004, at which point the enlarged Ministry argued that Russia needed more time before ratifying the Protocol. In September 2004 the Ministry fi nally came out in favour of the Protocol, while warning of the detrimental effect if Russia acted too quickly to realise its Kyoto commitments. Meanwhile the only political fi gures to back Kyoto openly have been Deputy Economic Minister Mukhamed Tsikhanov, then Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov, Vice Premier Viktor Khristenko, and most importantly, President Vladimir Putin. The only two close presidential advisers who doggedly opposed ratifi cation were economist Andrei Illarionov and climatologist Iurii Izrael. Meanwhile many other scientists from the Russian Academy of Science (RAS), an organization in which Izrael held a prominent position, supported Kyoto.
Other ministries and politicians either remained reticent or else produced confl ict- ing messages. The Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) opposed Kyoto until spring 2003, when two deputy ministers came out in favour. The Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Rosgidromet) was also prey to equivocation. Having consistently backed Kyoto until September 2004, it performed
84 jessica e. tipton

figure 1 Supporters andopponentsofKyoto withinRussia’spolitical circles.Arrowsindicate contradictionsand changesinstance.

a volte-face by linking up with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and RAS to campaign against ratifi cation. To add to the confusion, when Rosgidromet decided to lobby against ratification, it was essentially opposing its superior since MNR, by then supportive of ratifi cation, had taken over Rosgidromet in 2000. The then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, was also indecisive given that in May 2003, prior to his Ministry joining the anti-ratification lobby with Rosgidromet and RAS in September 2004, he actually showed his support. Meanwhile the Minister for Economic Development and Trade (MEDT), Germann Gref, initially a backer of the Protocol, turned against it in spring 2002, but then rejoined the proponents’ camp in September 2004.
One explanation for the prolonged delay in Russia’s assessment of the implications of Kyoto, and for the mixed messages emerging on the international scene from the Russian authorities, has been that the country’s policymakers were ‘at daggers drawn over the issue’. It seems that much of the confusion and antagonism stemmed from advisers making policy recommendations without much knowledge of the Kyoto process. In addition, Russia’s notoriously ineffi cient bureaucratic system did little to speed up the process. It does appear, however, that the government was divided. It has been argued that the splits resulted from various ministries vying with one another for stakes in implementing the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, which would bring additional income to their budgets and career opportunities for ‘progressive bureaucrats’. In the end, it was decided to spread the responsibility of implementing the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms for the 2008 to 2012 period between fi ve ministries: Rosgidromet, Industry and Energy, Agriculture, MNR, and MEDT. An alternative view is that Russia was purposefully dithering in order to blackmail the EU into releasing further concessions.

‘Is Kyoto Dead?’, Economist, 4 December 2003.

Michaelowa and Koch, p. 561.

Walters, ‘Russia Still Hesitant’.

Michaelowa and Koch, p. 562.

Even during the week that Russia announced its verdict on whether it would ratify the Protocol in late October 2004, mixed messages were still emerging from various authoritative voices. By this time, most of the parameters for Russia’s participation in the Kyoto process had been set and the authorities had already decided which ministries would implement each part of the Protocol. Therefore the continued antagonism between ministries and politicians right up until this stage implies that there were genuine communication difficulties and opposition within the Russian administration, which could explain much of the reason for the delay in ratifi cation.
It is equally hard to establish the role of the Duma in Russia’s decision to ratify. In July 2001, after the USA had withdrawn from Kyoto, the Duma showed its full support:
[the State Duma] expresses its confi dence that Russia can fulfi ll the Kyoto Protocol’s GHG reduction commitments [. . .] the Protocol is economically reasonable for Russia
[. . . The Duma] encourages Russia to play a key role in resolving the current logjam in negotiations and addressing the global climate problem.

International Institute for Sustainable Development/ UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘Special Report on Selected Side Events at UNFCCC COP-6 Part 11: Kyoto Protocol ratification, View of Russian Parliamentarians’, Earth NegotiationsBulletin, (July 2001) <http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop6bis/enbots/21july.html> [accessed 8 January 2006]

Yet in late 2003, by which time the economic and political benefi ts of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol to Russia had improved further, Putin said that ‘it would be diffi cult for the Russian authorities to persuade the State Duma to ratify the document’. Some observers even said that debates amongst a number of small parties in the parliament played a role in delaying ratification of the Protocol. It seems strange for Putin to have worried about Duma approval as the ‘party of power’, Unified Russia, was by then the largest party. According to a BBC report written after ratifi cation, ‘the Russian Duma was never expected to resist ratifi cation as it is fi lled with Vladimir Putin’s allies and the powerful President made his support for Kyoto clear last month’.

Vladimir Putin quoted in ‘Putin: Russia Won’t be Milk Cow’, Rusnet.nl, (21 October 2003) <http://www. rusnet.nl/news/2003/10/21/breakingnews02.shtml> [accessed 11 January 2007]

In fact the number of representatives supportive of Putin was much higher as many independents and smaller parties were also Putin supporters.

Hirsch.

Indeed, at the point of ratification the Duma appeared wholeheartedly to support the Protocol, as the Duma’s vice-speaker attested: ‘ratifying the protocol will streng then Russia’s international weight’. In October 2004 the State Duma ratifi ed the Protocol by 334 votes to 73, ridiculing any fears that it would not have been supported. Perhaps Putin’s comment on possible Duma opposition was posturing for international spectators, an attempt to show that Russia had a working parliament with the strength to veto legislative proposals.

Vladimir Pekhtin, Duma vice-speaker, quoted in Sitnina.

The Russian regions also played a role in climate politics. In early June 2003 the State Council, an advisory board to the President comprised of Russia’s eighty-nine regional governors, urged Putin to ratify the Protocol. Since the regions would be partly responsible for overseeing JI projects and compiling emissions logs (vital to Russia’s participation in international carbon credit trading), their support would facilitate the implementation of Kyoto. Despite Putin’s recent attempts to recentralise the country and reduce the regions’ power, the support of the regions would still have added to the President’s reasons for proceeding with ratifi cation.

‘Some of the History of the Long Wait for Russian Ratifi cation until 2003’, CAN-Europe website <http:// www.climnet.org/EUenergy/ratifi cation/russia.htm> [accessed 2 February 2006].

Russiannon-governmentalorganizations
Although Putin’s regime is often described as a ‘managed democracy’, Putin actually created numerous advisory institutes and committees. Although it would be naïve to assume that these organizations are wholly transparent and independent of the government, their impact on Russia’s decision to ratify must be considered. Unlike the equivocation shown by many of the above ministries, the stance of pressure groups was seemingly more straightforward.
Many sectors of Russian society campaigned intensively in favour of Kyoto. However they lacked the support of the general populace, mostly due to lack of awareness as mentioned in the environmental factors section of this article. The Russian Orthodox Church strongly backed Kyoto. As would be expected, Russian environmental groups consistently urged Putin to ratify the Protocol. WWF Russia published over one hundred articles in favour of Kyoto and set up an interactive webpage called ‘Kyoto, yes!’. Despite their campaigning, however, Putin’s crackdown on NGOs indicates that such groups could not play much of a role in influencing government policy. Furthermore, bearing in mind Putin’s negative appraisal of environmentalists, NGO activities could actually have had a stalling effect on government decision-making.

The World Council of Churches, including the Russian Orthodox Church, supported the publication of the document by Michael Grubb, Breer, Benito Müller et al., StrategicheskiianalizKioto-MarrakeshskoiSistemy (London: RIIA, 2003).

‘Kyoto, yes!’, WWF Russia, <http://kyoto-da.org.ru/docs/kyoto.shtml> [accessed 24 May 2005].

As well as these groups, there were many Russian individuals outside of government but with some level of political visibility, who actively campaigned for Russian ratifi cation of the Protocol. The most prominent were Viktor Danilov-Danilian (former Minister of Ecology), Igor Bashmakov (Director of Russia’s Center for Energy Effi ciency), Alexander Golub (senior economist for the US-based NGO Environmental Defense), Georgii Safonov (Moscow’s Higher School of Economics), Iurii Osipov (President of RAS), and Aleksei Iablokov (Eltsin’s environmental advisor and now president of Moscow’s Center for Ecological Policy). These fi gures all lobbied Putin through papers and via their respective organizations. In sharp contrast to the disarray of Putin’s ministers, these analysts consistently supported the Protocol. At times they coordinated their efforts by publishing seemingly well-researched documents, some of which have been mentioned in this article. As Russia participated in, and indeed hosted, various global conferences on Kyoto and climate change, such proponents had many chances to air their views, as did their opponents. Regarding the latter, however, one British observer noted after the 2003 World Conference on Climate in Moscow, organised by Kyoto opponents, that ‘the climate sceptics were allowed full rein and utterly destroyed their own case’. It is worth noting that all of the above Kyoto backers hold eminent positions in Russian institutions. Since Russians hold academic prowess in particularly high regard, it seems likely that Putin, especially considering his lack of expertise in economics and science, will have taken into account their arguments in reaching a decision.

Comment made by John Lanchbery of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.

Hirsch.

Putin’sstance
Unlike his ministries, Putin appeared for a long time to support the Kyoto process, despite not agreeing with some aspects of the process. One explanation for his support in the face of many negative assessments from advisers, ministries, and scientists, or at other times his reticence, could have been simple bargaining tactics. Perhaps the government secretly urged these fi gures to criticise Kyoto publicly in order to clinch the best possible deal for Russia, particularly after the US withdrawal put Russia in a powerful negotiating position. Much of the Western press agreed with the explanation that Russia delayed ratifi cation in order to blackmail the EU.

Ibid.

Working from the assumption that those advisers and Ministries that lobbied against ratifi cation were sincere, then even Putin’s closest advisers were unable to convince him to reject Kyoto. Negative media and science reports also failed to prevent Russian ratifi cation. As established previously, environmental groups’ positive assessment of Kyoto could not have had much clout with the Putin administration. The remaining group within Russia which may have held sway over Putin was big business, namely the energy industry. Since Russia’s energy industry was strongly in favour of Kyoto, the eventual ratification could indicate which lone domestic sector was still in a position to influence the President.
Outsideinfluences:TheEuropeanUnionandWorldTrade Organization
Many observers agree that the EU played a decisive role in the run-up to Russia’s ratification of the protocol. Since the EU was highly invested in the success of Kyoto, Russia would have done considerable damage to its political and economic relations with the EU and other developed countries by stalling the entire 2008 to 2012 Kyoto process. Consequently, Russia was in a good position to improve, or at least maintain, EU-Russian relations. As Duma Deputy Aleksandr Kosarikov said: ‘primarily it was Putin’s desire not to lose contact, not to move away from a common European politics’. Illarionov agreed on the importance of the EU: ‘Russian offi cials do not believe in the treaty’s scientifi c or economic merits but will ratify it anyway in a political gesture toward the European Union’. European politicians’ statements of gratitude towards Russia after its ratifi cation show the benefi ts made in terms of Russian-EU diplomacy.

Aleksandr Kosarikov quoted in Sundstrom and Henry, p. 9.

Greg Walters, ‘Illarionov Says Kyoto Will Be Ratifi ed’, MoscowTimes, 29 September 2004.

‘Summary of the 11th Conference of the Convention on Climate Change Parties’, EarthNegotiationsBulletin, 12.291, (November to December 2005) <http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop11/> [accessed 2 January 2006]; Ivan Ivanov, ‘Podrobnosti. Rossiia Pouchastvuet v Bor’be s Poteplenium’, EkhoPlanety, 8 October 2004.

But despite Russia’s apparent desire to curry favour with the EU by ratifying the Protocol, it seems that the situation was more complicated than a case of simple acquiescence, which could in part explain the lengthy delay in ratifi cation. Indeed, EU pressure on Russia to ratify the Protocol possibly backfi red as it was clearly resented by Russia. Illarionov likened it to colonial pressure: ‘an approach to Russia as a kind of banana republic [. . .] that is not a colony yet but about to become it [. . .] this is a total war against our country’. During the fi nal international negotiations on climate change, there were frequent interruptions due to Russians’ complaints over the lack of simultaneous translation, moves motivated either by strategy or insecurity vis-à-vis the West. A particular impediment to Russian support for ratifi cation was the realization that Kyoto signatories were eager for Russian participation since it would make Kyoto cheaper for them. Putin indicated that ‘Russia will not turn into a milk cow, at whose expense other countries [implying European] will solve their problems’. So while being prepared to go along with the Europeans, Russia also wanted to demonstrate its authority by taking time to decide whether to ratify and extracting the best possible concessions. Consequently, domestic, rather than foreign, scientists and economists may have carried more weight in the Putin administration.

‘Illarionov’s Remarks’.

OpportunitiesandChallenges, p. 1.

Vladimir Putin quoted in ‘Milk Cow’.

To complicate matters further, the view that the EU was anxious for Russian participation in Kyoto was not shared by Igor Leshukov, Director of St. Petersburg’s Institute for International Affairs. ‘Kyoto is suspiciously lacking from the EU-Russia energy dialogue [. . .] this means that the EU doesn’t consider Kyoto a priority, contradictory to its official declarations. Otherwise it would press Russia harder’. Perhaps by this time, however, the EU was simply heeding Putin’s desire for less interference in the Russian ratifi cation process of Kyoto.

Walters, ‘Russia Still Hesitant’.

Linked with Putin’s aim of strengthening EU relations was his desire for Russia to gain membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was one of the greatest aims of his Presidency. Thanks to Russia’s newfound role as potential Kyoto saviour, Putin was able to use Kyoto as a bargaining tool with the EU to clinch a deal on WTO membership. Every article on the subject of the Kyoto Protocol and Russia, whether written by a Westerner or a Russian, suggests that this was one of the President’s main incentives for ratification of the Protocol. For example,‘the Kremlin is only interested in ratification on grounds of partnership with EU about joining WTO’; ‘the stake is Russia’s entry into the WTO’.

‘Kyoto a-go-go’.

Leskov.

Despite this common belief, ‘Illarionov fl atly denied a WTO link to [Russia’s] position’. Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister, and Igor Iusofov, Energy Minister, were also adamant that the ratification of Kyoto was not linked to WTO membership. Putin likewise attested that he had not considered Kyoto in terms of WTO membership. However at an EU-Russia Summit in 2004 he announced that ‘the EU has made concessions on some points during the negotiations on the WTO. This will inevitably have an impact on our positive attitude to the Kyoto process’. So it seems clear that the lure of WTO membership triggered Russia’s fi nal decision in 2004 to ratify the Protocol. However, it does not follow that this was one of Russia’s foreseen incentives for ratifying the Protocol or its primary reason for delaying its decision on ratifi cation.

Walters, ‘Illarionov Says’.

Benito Müller, TheKyotoProtocol:RussianOpportunities (London: RIIA, March 2004), p. 11.

John Vogler, ‘The European contribution to global environmental governance’, International Affairs, 81 (2005), (p. 850).

TheimpactofUSA’swithdrawal
The USA’s withdrawal from Kyoto in March 2001 undoubtedly had a signifi cant impact on Russia’s attitude towards Kyoto. As discussed earlier, Russia’s potential income was severely reduced by the USA’s refusal to ratify the Protocol, which required Russia to reassess the economic incentives for participating in Kyoto. Russia was also affected politically by America’s departure. While rumours circulated that the US administration put direct pressure on the Russians not to ratify the Protocol, such an accusation appears to have been unfounded. Bearing in mind Russia’s negative reaction to EU interference, heavy-handed tactics from the USA to force Russia to pull out of the Kyoto process may have produced the reverse effect anyway.

Korppoo et al., p. 16.

Even if the USA did not directly try to infl uence Russia, American abandonment of Kyoto did affect Russians’ views. Crudely speaking, the USA’s withdrawal split Russians into two camps: anti-US Kyoto supporters and pro-US Kyoto opponents. There were also those Kyoto backers who believed that the USA might rejoin the climate change process at a later stage, and that Russia’s participation would encourage the Americans to do so. The above stances are present in the Russian media and Russian academic articles. Pro-Kyoto writers tried to drum up support by playing on traditional Russian-American antagonisms: ‘the American position is the product of quite egoistic economic interests’; ‘[the] USA has put a greater burden on less developed countries’. For these writers, Russia’s ratifi cation of the Protocol would show superiority over the selfi sh Americans, refl ecting traditional anti-US feelings and sending out an anti-capitalist message, reminiscent of Cold War times. Mikhail Kokeev, Russia’s representative on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a Kyoto supporter, takes the anti-US sentiments further by arguing that the Japan-EU-Canada-Russia club of Kyoto participants would ‘act as a defence against the interests of large American companies’. Kyoto opponents used the reverse argument, suggesting that Russia should follow the American example. Interestingly, there are similarities between many of the doubts held by Kyoto sceptics in Russia and the USA, mainly over the lack of fi rm scientifi c evidence for climate change and over the arguable economic costs of complying with the Kyoto mechanisms.

Mikhail Kokeev, ‘Problemi. Kioto. Spasti belikh medvedei’, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 31 December 2004,
p. 136.; Eduard Gushchin, ‘Ekologiia. Klimat ‘za’, a kto ‘protiv’?’, Parlamentskaiagazeta, 27 October 2004.

Ivanov; V.D. Pisarev, ‘Mezhdunarodnii terrorizm i global’nie ekologizheskie ugrozi’, Kanada. Ekonomika, politika,kul’tura, 30 November 2005.

Kokeev, p. 137.

Malinin; Tutina.

Some commentators have accounted for Russia’s equivocation over Kyoto as symptomatic of its diffi culty in balancing US and EU relations, with the ultimate decision to ratify the Protocol indicating that Putin’s foreign policy is more geared towards Europe than the USA. This is doubted by Mikhail Kokeev on the grounds that Kyoto is a multilateral, not a bilateral, treaty, and that the USA may rejoin the Protocol at a later date. In any case, US-Russian environmental cooperation had already waned before the Kyoto issue arose due to US frustration at Russia’s lack of enforcement of joint ecological projects. This implies that, apart from the signifi - cant economic implications of the US withdrawal, Putin was probably not overly concerned by the political implications of not toeing the American line. Siding with the EU and the UN was of more immediate political concern. From an economic point of view, as Russia sold more to the EU than to any other market, good relations with the EU were vital. Furthermore, given that the EU was more desperate to push Kyoto Protocol’s ratification than the US was to block it, ‘there is little chance that improved relations with the USA would “compensate” for this loss’.

Kokeev, p. 136.

Peterson and Bielke, p. 69.

Russia is the EU’s fi fth trading partner (after the US, Switzerland, China and Japan), while the EU is Russia’s main trading partner accounting for above fi fty percent of its total trade.

Berdin, p. 8.

Russia’simageabroad
The implications for Russia’s international image played a vital role in Russia’s decision to ratify the Protocol. Much was made of the fact that Russia held the keys to the whole global process once the USA had withdrawn: ‘without Russian consent it simply wouldn’t have come into force’; ‘it is hard to remember the last time when our voice has proved so decisive’.  This critical position was wielded to the benefit of both the country’s image as a whole and that of Putin as leader. Russia was anxious to use the now high-profile status of Kyoto to show the rest of the world that it was again an important international player. Post-Soviet Russia’s loss of superpower status explains this eagerness to be in a dominant position. Russia strives to be considered a democratic and developed country, as demonstrated by its enthusiasm to participate in ‘clubs’ of industrialised nations, such as the G8 and the WTO. Many Western observers therefore believed that by cooperating with a global environmental treaty Putin was hoping to improve a worsening image abroad which portrayed him as an increasingly authoritarian, isolationist leader.

Sitnina; ‘Rossiia kak predsedatel G8 predlozhit obsuzhdenie ekologicheskikh problem’, Interfax, 15 November 2005; Leskov.

‘Kyoto a-go-go’.

Russia’s role as central player in the international climate change scene, however, also presented problems symptomatic of the country’s tricky position in between the developed and developing groups of countries. While many Russians were desirous to appear an advanced country by ratifying the Protocol, others resented the fact that developing countries had no obligations at all when post-Communist Russia was also struggling economically. In other words, Russia wanted the glory of compliance while at the same time asking for economic concessions such as low targets and lenience over the ‘hot air’ issue. Perhaps it was once more this dichotomy between developed and developing, East and West, responsible for so many of Russia’s foreign policy dilemmas, that underlay the controversy and lengthy delay over Kyoto ratifi cation.

‘11th Conference’.

Conclusion
This article’s analysis has provided a glimpse into the complexities surrounding Russia’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Most Western observers believed, even after the USA withdrew, that Russia still had much to gain from joining Kyoto both economically and politically. Yet Russia stalled the ratification process by nearly two years. Observers developed a variety of theories both about the delay in ratifi cation and the decision to ratify the Protocol. As is often the case with Russian politics, it is diffi cult to establish what actually occurred within government circles. This conclusion will attempt to determine which explanations of why Russia finally ratified Kyoto appear most plausible.
On the environmental side, the combination of Russians’ preoccupation with everyday concerns rather than environmental issues, lack of awareness of climate change, some scientists’ doubts over climate change, and others’ belief that global warming would benefit Russia, as well as Putin’s overall environmental disregard, indicates that Russia did not ratify the Protocol for the global environmental good. While there were several top scientists and environmentalists who enthusiastically supported Kyoto, lack of media coverage and marginalization of NGOs meant that Iurii Izrael, the country’s foremost climate scientist and virulent Kyoto critic, overshadowed much of the Kyoto supporters’ environmental campaigning. Although Putin was aware of the advantage to his, and Russia’s, image by appearing ecologically conscious, Russia required more tangible incentives. As one analyst wrote, ‘Russia’s recalcitrance [was seen] as a rebuff to the way the EU generally, and its environment ministers specifi cally, have treated the [Russian] Federation in their narrow focus on environment in the context of what the Federation considers an economic issue’. Russia’s attitude towards Kyoto appears to follow a trend visible since Soviet times, when much of the USSR’s participation in international environmental treaties was little more than empty rhetoric.

Tom Jacob, ‘Refl ections on Milan . . . and the Current State of the Global Climate Response’, International
Emissions Trading Association, (13 January 2004) <http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/search.php> [accessed 28 February 2006]

Oldfield et al., p. 166.

Progress in Russia’s attempts to reduce carbon emissions will confirm to what extent any sincere belief in the environmental aims of Kyoto played a part in Russia’s ratifi cation. There were some positive signs after ratifi cation: ‘in spring 2005, the Russian Government approved a comprehensive plan of action regarding the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol’. However since then moves to reduce Russia’s emissions have been slow. Not until January 2008, after Putin’s departure from the Presidency, did the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announce the long awaited completion of Russian regulation and procedures to allow the operation of the JI mechanism in Russia. Although 61 Russian JI projects are already registered with the UNFCCC Secretariat offering reductions in GHG emissions totalling 125 MtCO2E (about twenty percent the of UK’s total annual GHG emissions), the belated implementation of the JI mechanism threatens the opportunity for even more substantial reductions in GHG emissions. A report published in December 2007 states that ‘[in] Russia, appropriate climate protection has not been exercised yet’ and ranks Russia bottom of the ten largest CO2 emitters, behind the USA and China, in terms of the rate of reduction in emissions levels. This comment on the 2006 G8 Summit held in St. Petersburg, for which Putin was in a position to select important topics, is telling:

Avdeeva, p. 300.

‘The Climate Change Performance Index: A Comparison of Emissions Trends and Climate Protection of the
Top 56 CO2 Emitting Nations’, Germanwatch, (2007), pp. 6, 12.

At the 2005 summit in Gleneagles Tony Blair highlighted climate change and Africa as the two most important issues for the heads of state and government to discuss. A year on [in St. Petersburg], the top item on the summit agenda is energy, but from a security rather than climate change perspective. The sense of a retreat is palpable.

Saleemul Huq and Camilla Toulmin, ‘The G8 Summit: Don’t Forget Climate Change’, Open Democracy, (12 July 2006) <http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=1&debateId=129&articleId=3728> [accessed 6 August 2006].

Another revealing sign is that Russia, along with the USA and China, objected to the UN Security Council’s decision to hold a debate on climate change in April 2007.

‘Written in Mercury’, Guardian, 27 April 2007.

Turning to the economic issues, a critical reason for the delay was the repercussion of the US departure. The loss of US demand for Russia’s carbon credits meant that this aspect of Kyoto would no longer bring Russia a guaranteed economic boon, although the energy sector’s enthusiasm for JI projects showed how much was still to be gained financially. The vehement opposition of Andrei Illarionov, Putin’s close economic adviser, encouraged the most doubt over the economic benefits of adopting Kyoto, principally that compliance would jeopardise Russia’s economic growth. As a result of such scepticism, Putin said Russia needed more time for economic analysis of the implications of ratifi cation. However, most Western critics, and many Russians, believed that Russia was in a ‘win-win’ situation all along. In the words of Igor Leshukov, Director of St. Petersburg’s Institute for International Affairs, ‘Russia already got the maximum, I can hardly imagine what type of better deal you could get’. Kyoto appeared particularly economically viable for Russia since energy effi ciency impro vements were already part of Russia’s development strategy before Kyoto became an issue. Therefore the more Russia delayed ratifi cation, the more these critics believed that the country was employing bargaining tactics.

Walters, ‘Russia Still Hesitant’.

Despite all the heated discussions over the economic aspects of ratification, there are many signs that these were secondary to the political issues, as Illarionov stated: ‘nobody sees any sense in the economic [or] scientific advantages for Russia in this document. It is just purely politics’. Viktor Danilov-Danilian, former Head of the State Committee on Ecology felt similarly: ‘The money that could be earned thanks to the Kyoto Protocol through selling allowances and receiving investments in Joint Implementation projects is of no interest to the authorities’. Indeed the long delay in ratifying the Protocol, to the detriment of Russia’s potential economic gains, revealed the lesser signifi cance of these monetary benefi ts for the Russian govern- ment. Meanwhile big business complained about the government’s inactivity in pushing through the necessary legislation to implement procedures for JI projects and emissions trading, which the Co-Director of RAO UES predicted had already lost the country fi fty million dollars by September 2005.

Andrei Illarionov quoted in Walters, ‘Illarionov Says’.

Viktor Danilov-Danilian, ‘What Can Russia Expect from the Kyoto Protocol?’, TowardsaSustainableRussia, 27 (2004), 11–13.

Müller, p. 11.

Sergei Konstantinov, Ekonomika. Effect Kioto. Rossiiskaiagazeta, 22 September 2005.

As previously discussed, nearly every publication mentions the importance of the WTO deal with the EU in Russia’s decision to ratify the Protocol. Other political incentives were the boost to Russia’s international image as Kyoto saviour, although the combination of enjoying this dominant position while resenting Western pressure caused confusion in Russia’s stance on the issue. Some commentators believed that Russia’s decision to ratify refl ected a preference for closer ties with the EU than with the USA. However, as Europe was more desperate for Kyoto to succeed than the US administration was for its failure, Russia’s decision to ratify the Protocol was probably made more out of necessity than out of preference.
As the above discourse indicates, some factors influenced Russia’s ratification more than others. The following contributed to the delay in ratifi cation: economic doubts over Kyoto spearheaded by Illarionov, extracting economic concessions to assuage these doubts, disorganization within the Russian government, lack of sense of urgency regarding climate change, and international pressure confusing Russia’s position. The eventual decision to ratify the Protocol can be explained primarily by the WTO membership deal with the EU, ease of compliance with the Protocol, support from Russia’s energy sector, improved ties with the EU, and benefi ts to Russia’s international image. Out of these factors, two of the strongest underlying explanations for ratifying the Protocol seem to have been the consistent pressure from the energy industry and from the EU, perhaps indicating two groups that still had a hold over Putin. The timing of Russia’s ratifi cation of the Protocol, only four months after the WTO deal, implies that the bait of WTO membership triggered the final decision to proceed.
Postscript
After Russia ratifi ed the Kyoto Protocol in November 2004, the global treaty entered into force in February 2005. Participant countries now have from 2008 until 2012 to meet their respective targets. As international negotiations for the post-2012 climate deal at the 2009 UN conference on climate change in Copenhagen draw near, it seems that again it will be diffi cult to foresee what stance Russia will take.
A scan of the Russian press since 2007 indicates that Russians are now more concerned about environmental issues, including climate change, than at the time of the debate about whether to ratify Kyoto. According to a survey conducted by the WWF in 2007, Russian companies show ‘considerable commitment to the introduction of environmental management systems and standards such as ISO 14001’. Meanwhile Pravda, which referred to the ‘myth of global warming’ in 2005, recently reported that ‘two thirds of Russians believe in global warming’. Similarly Argu- mentiiFakti, which in 2004 doubted the existence of climate change and referred to Kyoto as the ‘idkiotskii protokol’, is now publishing articles saying that climate change could wipe out fi sh living in coral reefs and that climate change will affect women across the world most severely as they are more reliant on natural resources for their livelihoods. Nevertheless, there are still virulent sceptics, such as Dr Oleg Sorokhtin (fellow of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences) who argues:

Brook Horowitz, ‘Stemming Climate Change’, St.PetersburgTimes, 18 December 2007.

‘Rossiiane veriat v global’noe poteplenie’, Pravda, 23 June 2008.

In Russian ‘Kyoto Protocol’ translates as Kiotskiiprotokol. The addition of ‘id’ (i.e. IdkiotskiiProtokol) is a play on words as idiotskii means ‘idiotic’ in Russian.

[Argumenti i Fakti] 2008, ‘Obitaiushchie v korallovykh rifakh ryby mogut ischeznut’, ArgumentiiFakti, 18
June 2008; ‘Ot globalnogo potepleniia bolshe postradaiut zhenshchiny’, ArgumentiiFakti, 7 May 2008.

[The] Earth is now at the peak of one of its passing warm spells. It started in the 17th century when there was no industrial infl uence on the climate to speak of and no such thing as the hothouse effect [. . .] The real reasons for climate changes are uneven solar radiation, terrestrial precession (that is, axis gyration), instability of oceanic currents, regular salinity fl uctuations of the Arctic Ocean surface waters, etc.

Oleg Sorokhtin, ‘A cold spell soon to replace global warming’, RIANovosti, 1 March 2008.

It is interesting to note, however, that below this article RIA Novosti printed the following text, which does not appear after other items: ‘the opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIANovosti’.
There are other signifi cant changes in the backdrop to the post-2012 climate deal negotiations that will affect Russia’s stance. Both John McCain and Barack Obama, who are currently vying for the US presidential seat from 2009, favour tougher emissions caps. Greater American cooperation in the post-2012 negotiations could affect Russia in two ways: either US participation in the deal will allow Russia to take a back seat and therefore opt out of the post-Kyoto framework, or the Russians could follow the American example.
The other key difference will be the role of the new Russian president, Dmitrii Medvedev. As discussed, Vladimir Putin was equivocal on the subject of the environment and Kyoto. Reports suggest that Medvedev is more pro-environment than his predecessor, reputedly driving the environment to the forefront of the political agenda with such declarations as ‘if we fail to deal with the ecological situation now, then in ten, twenty, thirty years large parts of Russia will be unfi t for living’. The new President also issued a decree in June 2008 instructing the Russian government to introduce measures to improve Russia’s energy effi ciency by forty percent by 2020. The leader of the upper house of Parliament, Sergei Mironov, has gone further by declaring that he is ‘absolutely convinced that both the Kyoto Protocol and the post-Kyoto process are vitally important’.

Dmitrii Medvedev quoted in Reuters, ‘Russia Must Act Now on Environment — Medvedev’, Planet Ark, (23 June 2008) <http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/48922/story.htm> [accessed 30 June 2008].

Konstantin Garibov, ‘Russia Supports G8 Efforts to Insure [sic] Energy Effi ciency for Tackling Climate Change’, Voice of Russia, (5 June 2008) <http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=28045&cid=57&p=05.0 6.2008> [accessed 30 June 2008].

Reuters, ‘Russia Warms to Kyoto and Emissions Cuts’, Carbon Positive, (5 June 2008) <http://www.carbon- positive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1113> [accessed 30 June 2008].

As in the early 2000s, though, there are confl icting messages emerging from the Russian authorities on climate policy. Despite the positive utterances outlined above, Medvedev has also commented that Kyoto offered Russia not only advantages but also significant disadvantages, despite predictions that Russia’s emissions are unlikely to exceed 1990 levels until 2020. In April 2008 Russia threatened not to cooperate in a new climate deal. The offi cial in charge of Russia’s Kyoto obligations, Vsevolod Gavrilov, who supported Kyoto in November 2004 (see Figure 1), said ‘Moscow would oppose cuts for the “foreseeable future”, arguing that the emerging middle class and industry needed to use more energy’.

[RIA Novosti] 2008, ‘Russia Won’t Exceed 1990 Level in CO2 Emissions Until 2020’, RIANovosti, 14 January 2008 <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080114/96592704.html> [accessed 1 July 2008].

Alister Doyle, ‘Russian Climate Plans Show Tough Path to UN Treaty’, Reuters, (30 April 2008) <http:// in.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idINL2992966320080430> [accessed 30 June 2008].

Such inconsistent messages indicate that Russia will play as elusive a role in negotiations for a post-2012 climate deal as for the Kyoto Protocol. This time, however, the more cooperative position of the Americans will take the spotlight and bargaining power away from the Russians. Crucially, ordinary Russians look set to become more involved in the debate.